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1. Introduction
The pattern of innovation in this country is constantly shifting. The rise of the
venture capital industry has lead to the emergence of startup firms founded to
commercialize new technologies.1 The rise of startup innovation is, in turn, challenging
the in-house R&D model which has dominated American industry since the turn of the
century.2 As innovation moves outside the locus of large firms, a new market is
emerging in the transfer of intellectual assets. Two trends suggest that this market will
continue to grow as an alternative to venture capital funded commercialization.
First, there is a recognized breakdown in the effectiveness of in-house R&D in
many industries. 3

The pharmaceutical pipeline is taking in increasingly larger sums of

money and producing fewer and fewer drugs.4 Traditional R&D giants are looking to
revitalize their internal efforts. Consequentially, firms are turning outside to find new
ideas.
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Second, there are a growing number of entrepreneurs who have stepped in to fill
this need. There has been a growth of independent invention workshops, and in firms
who actively search for inventors.5 Industries such as semiconductors are turning to
"fabless" commercialization models. Independent private laboratories and universities
are successfully raising revenue through licensing.6 Commentators suggest that the true
growth opportunity is not in idea generation, however, but in the role of intermediaries
who are able to commercialize the abundant supply of new ideas.7
Venture capitalists are increasingly getting involved. The new potential of the
R&D licensing market, coupled with the slump in the IPO market, has increased the
attractiveness of using technology transfer as an exit strategy. Firms such as Cerian
Technology Ventures have sprung up to asses and remarket the intellectual property of
failed startup firms.8 The Venture Capital Journal has recently run several articles
discussing the potential of mining portfolio companies' patent portfolios for value9.
The investment community has traditionally been weary of patent-based
transactions. The Harvard case study of Aberlyn Capital Management10, for example,
highlights the risks of using patent-backed loans. Often, unwary investors can end up
stuck with a patent that is effectively worthless when the firm which created it failed. For
these transactions to gain acceptance, their risks and rewards must be better understood.
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What is needed is a tool for valuing startup patents which incorporates the risks of
technology transactions.

2. The Need for a Patent Analysis
This Paper attempts to fill that need by devising an analysis for valuing portfolio
company patent rights. The analysis is intended for investors seeking to utilize patents in
firm valuations, as collateral for financing, or as an exit strategy. The valuation of
patents is a complicated and speculative task. Much has already been written upon it. It
has been addressed in several divergent bodies of literature: finance works valuing assets
in the M&A context, legal works addressing infringement damages, and economic works
valuing patents for use as data sources. There is also a related body of industrial
organization literature which addresses the effect of IP rights on startup firm
commercialization.
By focusing specifically on VC-funded startup firms' patents, this Paper takes
advantage of several simplifying assumptions which will allow it to integrate the analyses
of legal and industrial risks with standard valuation techniques. This analysis addresses
some of the problems facing venture capital investors.
This analysis reduces some of the uncertainty of investing in startup firms.
Because it is based on publicly available information – patent searches, royalty rates, and
the like - the valuation can be performed without any input from the entrepreneur at all.
When inventors show up looking for funding with nothing other than an idea and a
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business plan, the resale value of the idea should be as important as the projected value of
their enterprise.
By lowering the transaction costs of a licensing transaction, this analysis opens up
the potential for out-licensing as an exit strategy. These exits have the potential to
mitigate the cyclic nature of the venture capital industry by offering investors the ability
to exit their investment without having to wait for external business cycles to rebound.
These exits also ameliorate some of the illiquidity issues with startup investment. A
startup firm increases the value of its patents during development by eliminating the
technical risk associated with the underlying technology. Out-licensing of unused
technology, or of future interests in patent rights, can serve as a rapid means of selling off
some of the value created by the startup firm prior to the outright sale of the firm.

3. Approach
A patent is worth nothing on its own. It encompasses a right to make or sell an
invention. Any revenue which derives from the patent must come from sales of products
containing the patented invention.
When a startup firm gets a patent, it has two choices. First, it can make and sell
the invention itself, using its patent monopoly to keep competitors out of the market
while it acquires the resources needed to enter production. Alternatively, it can sell its
patent rights to another company which has the resources necessary to commercialize the
invention in exchange for royalties on the final sales.
There are, therefore, two potential measures of a patent's value. The first is the
amount of profits which the patent owner could realize through making and selling the
4

patented goods itself. Computing this value is done by the Analytical Approach, which
looks at the financial performance of manufacturers of similar products to determine
benchmark profits.11
Alternatively, a patent can be valued as the price which a company wishing to
commercialize the invention would be willing to pay for a license. This is the Relief from
Royalty approach.12
For an investor in a startup firm, the Relief from Royalty approach is the most
helpful because it best approximates the resale value of the patent. It is comparable to a
piece of production equipment. An investor who is valuing the asset as collateral is more
interested in the equipment's value on the market than in the future profits derived from
the goods it produces. Profits from sales of patented goods are dependent on the business
which will commercialize the patent, whereas future royalty streams represent the value
which any owner of the patent can receive.
Three types of approaches are generally used to estimate future royalty streams.
Just like startup firms, patents can be valued using Cost, Market-Comparables, and
Income.13
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The most rudimentary approach is to use historical costs such as the R&D and
regulatory investment in acquiring the patent right.14 Because the sunk costs in a patent
bear almost no relation to the potential revenues from an invention, however, this method
does not accurately reflect the potential resale price.
A market-based approach looks to similar transactions as a source of the expected
future value. In theory, this approach has great appeal to predicting licensing revenue
because it is based on comparison of previous licensing deals. Furthermore, the legal
standard of the reasonable royalty is based in part on the prevailing market rate for
technology.
However, several practical problems with this approach are often cited as its
downfall. First, it is by definition impossible to identify a truly comparable market
transaction.15 Patents are by statutory definition unique goods. Therefore, there will
always be differences between other traded technologies and the one at issue.
Furthermore, the dynamic of the technology transaction can vary significantly from
transaction to transaction.16
The second significant shortcoming in the market-based approach is the scarcity
of information on technology transactions.17 The terms of these transactions are
generally not made available to the public. Even when deals are announced, key pricing
terms are often omitted.
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This difficulty, however, mimics the general informational scarcity in the venture
capital industry. In fact, there is much more information available on patent transactions
than for many other aspects of the venture capital industry. By focusing on licensing to
established companies, this analysis generally focuses on interactions with publicly held
firms. At least some firms consider licensing transactions sufficiently material to
disclose them. Furthermore, patent disputes do sometimes end up in the courts, where
the terms of litigated royalty rates are public knowledge.
The use of market-comparables can be enhanced through the use of value
characteristics.18 Value characteristics are used in the valuation of private companies to
serve as the basis for comparison with companies for whom valuation data is available.
An ideal value characteristic is easily quantifiable and serves as a good proxy for firm
value.
The most popular patent valuation method is the income approach. This approach
values the patent as the present value of future earnings.19 The future income streams
from a patent are computed using either a discounted cash flow ("DCF") or real options
approach.20 The DCF approach looks at the income stream derived over the life of the
patent, and adjusts for the risks involved in income production. The real options
approach considers the technology as an option which the owner may exercise if and
when the costs of implementation are outweighed by the benefits of patent use.
The DCF method is best suited for this application. Royalty streams are easily
valued as a series of annual payments. Furthermore, the technique is well-suited to
18
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capture the effect of the duration and risks of the transaction. Because of the compound
assessments of risk in this calculation, a potential future expansion would be to use some
form of Monte Carlo simulation.
Patent valuation techniques have been applied to a wide variety of situations,
from M&A valuation to infringement royalties. The choice of technique is governed by
the context of the valuation. This Paper performs the valuation in the eyes of a venture
capitalist or other investor who has secured the rights in a patent from an entrepreneur in
exchange for financing. This Paper assumes that the entrepreneur has failed to turn a
sufficient profit, and that the investor chooses to cease commercialization of the
invention and instead raise revenue through licensing.
This Paper will first calculate future royalties through using market-comparables.
The Paper defines a series of value characteristics which to be used in comparing
comparable transactions. Once royalty streams are calculated, the Paper will find their
net present value, capturing the risks of the licensing transaction in the discount rate.
A number of factors affect the success of patent licensing. They can be
categorized as Legal, Technical, and Industrial. Legal risks stem from the quality of the
patent itself and the nature of the relief which the courts will grant. Technical risks
reflect the quality and value of the underlying technology. Industrial risks characterize
the difficulties of finding a buyer for the licensed technology, and look at the
organization of firms within the industry.
Each of these risks will be explored below. For each area, risks are identified for
use in determining the discount rate and value characteristics are defined for use in
comparable analysis.
8

4. Litigation Damages and Patent Quality
A patent is nothing more than a set of legal rights. In order to understand the
value of a patent, one must first understand exactly what those rights entitle one to do.
The patent grant conveys nothing other than the right to "exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States"21 It does
not convey any positive right to practice the invention itself. Therefore, the ultimate basis
for the value of a patent is the legal damage award that one can receive from an infringer.
A potential licensee should be willing to pay no more for a license he stands to
lose in a patent lawsuit. That is sum of the probability-discounted infringement damages
and the cost of litigation:

ROYALTY

(LITIGATION RISK • DAMAGES ) + LITIGATIONCOST
Damages

A patent owner is entitled to both monetary and injunctive relief. Monetary relief
compensates the patent owner for past infringement, and injunctive relief will prevent
future infringement. The statutory provision for monetary damages grants "damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer."22 In practice, this translates
into damages for Lost Profits and a Reasonable Royalty. It is noteworthy that, with the
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exception of design patents, the patent owner is not entitled to disgorge the profits that
the infringer has earned.
Lost profits compensate for economic damages that the patent owner experienced
due to unlawful competition. In the licensing context, however, the patent owner is not
engaged in an enterprise which utilizes the patent. Consequentially, the owner has no
profits to have lost, and is only eligible to receive a reasonable royalty. Methods for
determining the royalty rate and base will be developed below.
In addition to monetary compensation for past infringement, the patent owner can
often get an injunction prohibiting the infringer from continuing to manufacture.
Injunctions are offered at the court's discretion. There is a considerable risk that a patent
owner engaged in royalty generation will not be viewed as a sympathetic candidate for an
injunction against infringers. The Federal Circuit has denied a preliminary injunction in a
case where a non-manufacturing owner was attempting to generate royalty revenue.23
The court stated in particular that "the lack of commercial activity is a significant factor"
in assessing the need for an injunction, and that evidence that the patentee offered a
license to the infringer prior to litigation was clear evidence that it was "willing to forgo
its patent rights for compensation."24 Furthermore, a district court has recently upheld the
denial of a permanent injunction as a damage award in a similar case.25 The court gave
particular notice to the inventor's expressed desire to "[S]ell off our Intellectual Property
rights."26
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Because of the unlikelihood of receiving a permanent injunction, and the lack of
lost profits, damages can simply be computed as the product of the royalty rate and
royalty base summed for each potential licensee:
DAMAGES = ROYALTY RATE • ROYALTY BASE

Royalty Rate
The calculation of reasonable royalties is the subject of much litigation. The
courts generally apply the standard of "the hypothetical negotiations between willing
licensor and willing licensee."27 Such a negotiation is presumed to be an arms-length
negotiation between parties who have not yet resorted to litigation.28 The reasonable
royalty is, as defined, basically the market rate for the technology license. 29

Litigation Costs
The excessive expense of patent litigation has a large effect on parties' license
valuation. The cost of litigating a patent case has been estimated to be from $1 Million
for small cases to up to $3 Million for large cases.30 Economic losses due to a
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preliminary injunction are not likely to be an issue, because, as discussed above, the court
will likely not grant such an injunction.31

Litigation Outcome
The final component of this analysis is the projected litigation outcome. This
analysis will use the historical probability of plaintiff victory to predict infringer
behavior. This ignores, for the sake of simplicity, the potential effects of differing
expectations on the outcome of litigation.
Empirical studies put the probability of patentee victory, taken at the time a
compliant is filed, at nominally 50%.32 This serves as the starting point in predicting
litigation outcomes. However, refinement can be had by further unpacking the litigation
process. A patent trial first adjudicates the validity of the patent, and then determines if

infringement has occurred. In order to be granted a patent, the patentee must persuade
the patent office that his application meets certain legal standards. The patent office's
determination of validity, although presumed to be correct, can be challenged during the
litigation process. If a patent is found invalid at trial, then it can generally not be
enforced again. Conversely, a trial court's finding of validity, though not binding in
future cases, is a good indication of the patent's validity.
Therefore, the outcome of any previous litigation for a patent can have a
significant impact on its value.33 If a patent has been previously found invalid, the
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chance of winning is effectively zero. If it has been found valid and infringed, its
chances of future litigation success are greatly increased.
If the patent has not been subject to prior litigation, there are several legal risks
that can still be identified. The liberal granting of patents by the PTO has sometimes put
it ahead of the courts in offering protection to rapidly advancing technologies. For
example, patents granted on modified living organisms were not upheld until the
landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty34, and business methods were not patentable
until State Street Bank35. Furthermore, the cursory examination given by the government
during the application process often fails to find anticipating prior art which might be
uncovered during litigation. Other issues, such as the potential risk of the first-inventor
defense for business methods, will also need to be analyzed and catalogued.

5. Patent Scope
The previous section addressed the potential size of damages which a patent
holder might recover from an infringer. In this section, the number of potential infringers
against which a legally sound claim exists is evaluated. A patent is, ultimately, nothing
more than a legal document which describes and claims a piece of technology space for
the owner. Therefore, two patents on comparable subject matters may be written in such a
manner as to claim vastly different sizes of the technology space. Furthermore, the courts
may interpret two facially similar patents very differently in light of other legal doctrines
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and policies. Consequentially, the scope of the patent document itself dictates the size of
the patent's market for licensees.
The most fundamental conception of the scope of a patent grant is the actual size
of the claimed technology space. Drawing a parallel to real property, the value of a
patent is directly related to its size in the same manner as the value of a piece of land is
related to its acreage. There are several reasons why a large patent is more valuable than
a small one. First, a large patent may cover multiple technologies. The purchaser of a
license would be enabled to commercialize several inventions. Because exclusive
licenses can be granted for specific applications of a patent, several exclusive licenses can
be carved out of a broad patent. Furthermore, a broader patent is more difficult to invent
around.

Subjective Approach: Identifying Applications and the Royalty Base
A three-step process can be used to measure the ultimate scope and reach of a
patent. First, the claimed technology is identified, and any limitations in the claims are
noted. This gives the overall claimed technology space. Next, the fields of use which
intersect with the claimed space must be identified. Finally, the scope of the royalty base
is determined, in light of the Entire Market Value Rule.
A patent applicant will claim as much of the technology space as is possible
without stepping on the bounds of previous patents. To avoid previous patents, the
applicant will add limitations restricting what he claims. Because the claims are verbal
descriptions of complex technologies, they must be interpreted to ascertain what they
cover.
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During litigation, the court construes the exact scope of a patent's claims.36 When
a patent has not been litigated, the most effective approach is to assemble a panel of
experts, comprising patent attorneys, managers, and scientists, to read the document and
reflect upon the content of its claims.37
A patent can reach beyond its literal scope through the doctrine of equivalents.
The doctrine essentially states that a defendant will be found to be infringing if his
technology is an "equivalent" of the patented technology. This extension is broadest
when patents are written in new and open fields, but can be limited by procedural
complications during the application process.38 Therefore, a legal analysis should also
include an analysis of the patent's prosecution history.
Any product which contains all of the elements in a patent claim will infringe.
Therefore, once the scope of the claims is established, all potential infringing uses should
be listed. For example, a patent covering LCD technology may have applications in the
PDA field, the computer monitor field, and the aeronautical instrument field. Of these,
the most lucrative should be retained for further analysis.
Finally, the scope of the royalty base should be determined under the Entire
Market Value Rule39. The rule dictates what sales can be included in a royalty base for
damages. Final product sales are included in the royalty base, so long as (1) the patented
component works as an integral component of the final product, and (2) the benefits of
the patented feature drive customer demand for the final product. For example, a
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patented LCD display licensed for use in car stereos would have a claim on stereo sales,
but probably not the final price of every car sold with the units.

Statistical Approaches
Given the cost of the qualitative approach, and its limitations when considering
large numbers of patents, there have been numerous attempts to correlate quantifiable
patent data with the size of the protected technology. These statistical approaches are
useful for comparing the relative scope of patents in comparable transactions.
Research suggests that claim breadth is correlated with the Patent Office's
assignment of field codes.40 When a patent application is considered by the government,
it is assigned a classification to a particular technology area. If a patent covers a broad
area of technology it might be assigned to several classifications. Empirical analysis has
shown that when a patent is assigned to multiple categories it is likely to be more
economically valuable, and, consequentially, to have a greater scope.
Citation data can also be used as a measure of claim scope. When a patent
applicant comes across a piece of prior art, such as a scientific publication or another
patent, which is closely related to the idea he is patenting, he must include a citation to it
in his application, and explain to the examiner why his invention is not anticipated by it.
The number of these citations made outside of the patent's class has been developed as
another measure of the breadth of the patent claims. The measure, termed "Originality"
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measures the number of citations made out of the patent's class, and the number of
classes cited.:41

ORIGINALITY = 1

n
j

s 2j

Where n is the total number of patent classes that the patent cites, and s is the
proportion of those citations the patent makes in a given class j.

Statistics regarding prosecution history have also been applied to ascertain claim
value.42 These measure things like the seniority of the patent examiner, or the time spent
on the patent application. However, these statistics primarily report on the patent agent's
assessment of the patent's value as reflected in his allocation of time and energy to the
prosecution process. Like renewal data analysis,43 these statistics serve more as an expost proxy for the patent-owner's assessment of value than as a tool which can help the
patent owner assess the strength of his legal entitlement.

6. Technology Quality and Importance
Assuming that the patent affords adequate protection, the next determinant of
patent value is the value of the underlying technology which it represents. While the
quality of an innovation is a qualitative notion, some metrics do exist which can afford a
framework for analysis. The most ready framework is the measure of technical risk
41
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employed in an industry. The quality of an invention can also be measured using patent
statistics.

Technical Risk
Every R&D project is an exercise in overcoming technical risk of failure.
Although an innovation must be "reduced to practice" and be "useful" before the Patent
Office grants a patent, it does not necessarily follow that the commercially viable
embodiment of the invention will work. Many industries have a series of milestones by
which to quantify the risk that an invention will fail. For example, the pharmaceutical
industry has a regimented series of milestones through which a drug application must
pass. Factory equipment, similarly, goes from process definition through design, to pilot
tests, and finally to full-scale rollout.
Technical risk is just as important in licensing as it is in commercialization
because royalties are based upon licensee sales. It will ultimately be factored into the
overall discount rate for the royalty stream. Venture capitalists will demand rates of
return as high as 50% for technologies which have not been reduced to prototype, and
30% for technologies ready for commercial rollout.44
There is a considerable variation of risk from industry to industry. A software
patent, for example, is almost guaranteed to work, while a pharmaceutical patent has a
long series of tests to undergo before entering the market.

Patent Statistics

44

See SMITH, supra note 11, at 556.

18

Patents that represent better ideas should be more valuable. Drawing from the
requirements for patentability, an invention which is exceedingly non-obvious or useful
has a greater potential to be a breakthrough idea. The most reliable means of measuring
such inventive novelty is, as discussed above, to perform a qualitative assessment of the
patent document. There is also a potential to make use of the citations developed during
patent prosecution as value characteristics.
As developed above, patent citations indicate closely linked technologies. A
patent which has been cited many times is, therefore, relevant to many subsequent
inventions. Not only does this indicate that it would have a broader scope, but it also
indicates that others have felt it beneficial to continue along its line of research.
Patent citation counts can be generated in many of the available on-line databases.
There have been numerous refinements upon basic counts. A weighted count can be
performed, where the value of each citation received is in turn weighted by the number of
citations that that patent receives.45 A generality index can be calculated, like the
originality index, by measuring the proportion of citations received which fall outside the
patent's field.46 A final measure is the proportion of scientific papers to which the patent
cites, with the theory being that more fundamental technologies are more innovative.47

7. Technology Market Concerns
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The previous sections have addressed metrics for measuring the quality of a
patent itself. However, the key determinant of the value of a patent is, ultimately, the
price it commands on the market. This section addresses measures of the size of the
market for a particular patent license.
It is assumed that the patent owner has been unable to achieve success
commercializing the patent in a startup firm, and has resorted to raising royalties through
licensing. It is further assumed that the potential customers for such licenses are
established firms in the relevant industry. Given the current amount of venture capital
funding which is available, as well as the propensity of venture capitalists to actively
assist promising investments with financial and management resources, it is assumed that
the failure of a startup firm is due to the ineffectiveness of the startup mode of
commercialization, and that there would be no benefit in licensing the technology to
another startup firm.

The Technology Market
The probability of finding a licensee is much higher if there is a healthy market
for the licensed technology. A large body of literature exists which describes the factors
which give rise to such a market, and its effect on the commercialization strategy of
startup firms.48 For the purposes of valuation, it is assumed that of two patents of
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comparable scope and quality, the one for which a larger and more efficient market exists
will be able to generate more income for its owner.49 Using the framework derived by
Gans and Stern50, this analysis focuses on the effectiveness of patents as a means of
appropriability and the distribution of complimentary assets.

Excludability Effectiveness of Patents
The actual preclusive effect of a patent varies considerably with the nature of the
technology in which it is used. For example, a patent on a chemical compound may be
sufficient to prevent an infringer from practicing a technology, whereas a patent on a
mechanical product may be designed around with considerable ease. Patents which
cannot effectively block commercialization by others, even if enforced, are of little value.
Several factors affect the value of patents to prevent appropriation.51 First,
infringement must be detectable. Technologies whose use would be hard to detect in a
finished product would, therefore, be difficult to enforce. Furthermore, the patent must
be difficult to invent around.52 Pharmaceutical patents are, for example, particularly
valuable because of the fact that a described chemical embodiment often has properties
which cannot be replicated by similar compounds. Patents are more effective when their

Start-Ups that Exploit Patented Academic Knowledge Survive?, 21 J. IND. ORG. 1391 (2003), Ashish
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Working Paper 7851, 2000.
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enforcement is less costly than other means of protection, such as secrecy and lead time.53
Finally, patents are more effective if the technology is such that the knowledge needed to
execute is can be codified, or easily memorialized and transferred, as opposed to
industries where most of the know-how necessary to commercialize a product is tacit, and
cannot be controlled through patent enforcement.54
The overall effectiveness of patents varies from industry to industry. Although an
analysis of the aforementioned factors can be performed for any industry, this effort can
be avoided by turning to empirical research. Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh55 performed a
survey of executives to determine the relative effectiveness of patents in various
industries. They have found, for example, that pharmaceutical and medical patents are
effective while software patents are not.

Complimentary Assets
The distribution of complimentary assets in an industry can have significant
impact on the ability of a patent owner to profitably out-license. Complimentary assets
are the technologies and organizations which are necessary to bring the patented
technology into commercial existence. One of the key benefits of licensing a technology
is to capitalize on the profits of a firm which is better suited to take advantage of the
technology than the inventor.
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There are several types of complimentary assets required to commercialize an
invention.56 Complimentary technologies are the downstream technologies directly
needed to bring an innovation to market. These include manufacturing, distribution, and
marketing. Prior technologies include existing product platforms in which the innovation
must operate. For example, an improvement in LCD technology must interface with
existing computer monitor technology in order to be sold. Finally, enabling technologies
are convergent technologies which might be integrated with the innovation in future
product applications. Small LCD displays capable of replacing CRT's had to be
integrated with microprocessor and software innovations in order to create the PDA
market. For profits to be realized, these assets must all be brought together, along with
the license, within the boundaries of the same firm.
A technology can be either specific or general with regard to these complimentary
assets.57 A general technology can be commercialized through many different pathways,
thus creating many potential downstream licensees. A more specialized technology, on
the other hand, will have fewer licensees to choose from. Consequently, a broad patent
which covers many different applications can be commercialized by more firms, and
should, therefore, be easier to market.
The complimentary assets may be specialized or generic with regard to their
applications.58 Specialized complimentary assets are only able to commercialize a small
number of applications, whereas generalized complimentary assets can be adapted to
many uses. Retail distribution networks are general with regard to what they can
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distribute, as opposed to high-throughput drug-screening equipment whose use is limited
to pharmaceuticals.
Complimentary asset distribution drives the market for patent licenses. The
market is strongest when there are a large number of firms with complimentary assets,
and when those assets are specialized with regard to what they can be used to produce.
When there are a relatively small number of firms situated to commercialize an
innovation, the strength of the patentee’s monopoly is diminished by the low supply of
partners. Likewise, when the complimentary assets are specialized, manufacturers are
less able to work around the patentee’s monopoly by producing different goods.
Industry concentration is another factor which drives price.59 In concentrated
industries, a small number of firms hold a large percentage of the assets. Firms in a
fragmented industry are more prone to be under competitive pressures, and are more
likely to adopt external technologies to secure a competitive advantage. Firms in
concentrated industries are larger and more established, and are under less pressure to
turn outside for help.

Adverse Selection
It is important to realize that the factors which affect the ability to find a licensee
also often affect the success of a startup firm. In fact, factors such as the presence of a
large number of firms with the necessary complimentary assets to develop a technology
work against the startup firm. Likewise, startup firm failure is more likely in
concentrated industries, when the firm must compete with entrenched incumbents for
market share. Consequentially, these situations mitigate some of the adverse selection
59
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risk of purchasing a technology which could not be commercialized by its inventor. In
some situations, there is more risk that a firm which has failed has done so because of
competitive pressures, as opposed to the inadequacy of its technology.

8. Technology Pull
Even if a potential market for a technology exists, the price commanded by the
licensor is dependant upon demand. Many established firms shy away from the external
acquisition of technology. The "not invented here" syndrome is probably the biggest
impediment to a successful licensing operation. The literature suggests several
conditions when firms look to external innovations in lieu of internal R&D.60 These
situations are often transient, and external technology sourcing is often not a viable longterm business model.61 However, when these situations arise, the value of a licensed
technology can rapidly increase.
External sourcing is driven by high competitive intensity. In new product spaces
in particular, the race for the first-mover advantage can put development time at a
premium. Off-the-shelf innovations, while perhaps less desirable than internally
designed products, can be implemented much more quickly. Furthermore, cost pressures
in some industries do not support active in-house R&D. In such situations, firms seeking
innovative expansion must look outside to fill their needs.
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Firms resort to external sourcing in the face of dynamic product changes because
their core R&D efforts cannot keep pace with external technical advances. In such
situations, external sourcing serves as a stopgap to fill the product pipeline until internal
R&D assets can be retooled to react to the new technology trends.
External sourcing is reemerging in light of the perceived failure of in-house R&D
to generate radical breakthroughs.62 The pharmaceutical industry, for example, is
cultivating external relationships in light of the inability of in-house R&D efforts to fill
their product pipeline.
Finally, external sourcing is a more viable option when the patented invention is
autonomous.63 Autonomous inventions, such as a spark plug, can generally be
commercialized on their own, whereas systemic innovations, like a rotary engine, must
be integrated with other developments. The costs of managing integration with external
suppliers and customers often outweigh the benefits of external sourcing.

9. Technology Liquidity
There is potential risk of patent illiquidity due to the high transaction costs of a
licensing deal. Specifically, there are often difficulties in locating a prospective
purchaser, and, once a purchaser has been identified, communicating and allocating the
risks of commercialization.
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Technology transfers are plagued by uncertainty and information asymmetry.64
Neither party fully knows if the project can be successfully commercialized, but the seller
does have a much better idea than the buyer.65 Rather than probing the economic
implications of these problems, this analysis will make the assumption that these
problems can best be ameliorated, much as they are in the venture capital industry,
through reputation and informal networks.
Prior works have identified several factors which correlate with reduced
transaction costs. Affiliation with venture capitalists is an indication of successful
communication because of their perceived contacts with technology buyers.66 Prior
dealings between the licensor and licensee have been taken as indicia of open
communication and trust.67 Likewise, a history of in-licensing by the licensee can
establish a reputation for fair dealing in an industry.68 Finally, the "name-brand"
recognition of the inventor of assignee often signals technical strength.69
These measures are most relevant for evaluating comparable transactions. It is
assumed that the assignee of rights conducting this valuation would likely be a venture
capitalist or other individual with the necessary network to successfully market the
technology.
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10. Application of a Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
This section develops an integrated analysis utilizing all of the factors discussed
in the Paper. The analysis begins with identifying the potential licenses which can be
sold for a patent. It then prices each license as a pre-litigation settlement, considering the
royalty base and a reasonable royalty rate. The reasonable royalty is calculated by
comparison to similar transactions. Next, the potential risks of the transaction with
regard to technical and market failure are evaluated, and the risk level is used to compute
a RAHR. Finally, the present value of each potential royalty stream is calculated.

Step 1: Identifying the Income Stream
The first step is to calculate the potential income stream. This is done by
estimating the number of potential licensees, and estimating the license payment. First,
the royalty base must be identified, as discussed in Section Five. The sales volume of the
market must then be estimated. Hopefully, the management of the portfolio company
will already have much of the necessary data.
After potential markets are identified, a royalty rate is identified in each market
through evaluating comparable transactions using the metrics developed above:
Factor
Litigation Risk
Patent Scope
Technical Quality

Technology Market

Technology Pull
Technology Liquidity

Metric
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Prior Patent Litigation
Number of IPC Claims
"Originality" Measure
Technology Stage
Weighted Backward Citation
Count
"Generality" Measure
Scientific Citation Percentage
Technology Appropriability
Industry Complimentary Asset
Distribution and Specialization
Presence of Disruptive Factors
Technology Autonomy
Association with VC
Prior Dealings Between Firms
Licensee Reputation
Inventor Reputation
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After considering comparable transactions, an estimated royalty rate should be
determined. With this in hand, the annual income from the license can easily be
computed, taking into account the effect of uncertainty and litigation costs:

AnnualIncome =

(LitigationRisk • RoyaltyRate • RoyaltyBase) + LitigationCosts
AllLicenses

Step 2: Risk Calculation
Next, the effect of risks must be captured. This analysis has so far utilized a very
qualitative measure of risk. One potential area for growth is the use of more formalized
risk estimation, perhaps with Monte Carlo analysis. The key risks discussed were the risk
of technical failure and technology market risks, including the existence of potential
buyers, lack of demand for external technology, and potential illiquidity. A discount
factor can be estimated based upon a qualitative assessment of these risks.
Razgaitis70 has computed the discount rate used in IP licensing negotiations,
based on technical and market risk. These values are somewhat lower than
approximations of discount rates used by VC’s, but it is assumed that profit generation
through out-licensing is less risky than through startup commercialization. 71
Description
Proven Technology with Reliable
Customer
Well-Understood Technology with
Existing Market with Evidence of
Demand
New Application of Understood
Technology with Existing Market
Novel Technology or Unknown
Market
Unproven Novel Technology with
Unknown Market

k
15-20%
20-30%
25-30%
35-45%
50-70%
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Step 3: Computation
Finally, the value of the license can be taken as the present value of the future
earnings. The royalty stream will be summed over the life of the patent. Patents have a
maximum life of twenty years, and antitrust laws dictate that royalty payments stop when
the patent expires72. Consequentially, there is no need to consider a terminal value:
Value =

N
n

AnnualIncome
(1 + k )n

11. Conclusion
This Paper has described an analysis of the value of patents held by startup firms
by analyzing the out-licensing of startup technology to established firms. It considers six
factors that determine patent value. The reflect risks of legal unenforceability, technical
risk, and technology transaction risks. These factors are then incorporated into an
analysis that uses market comparables to find royalty rates, and a discounted cash flow to
find the present value. This analysis is expected to be of value to venture capital firms in
evaluating the use of patent-based transactions using the intellectual property of their
portfolio companies. Current trends in R&D and innovation suggest that such
transactions will become more prevalent in the near future.
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